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NOTE
INTEL CORP. v. HAMIDI: PRIVATE PROPERTY, KEEP OUT-
THE UNWORKABLE DEFINITION OF INJURY FOR A TRESPASS
TO CHATTELS CLAIM IN CYBERSPACE
INTRODUCTION
Imagine: it is a Monday morning and you are sitting at your desk with a
cup of coffee in hand, ready to attack the day. You log on to your computer
and check your e-mail, only to find that your in-box is full of hundreds of
spain e-mail messages, i.e., junk mail that you will have to spend your pre-
cious time wading through before deleting, to ensure you do not inadver-
tently delete an essential message from a client or an instruction from your
supervisor. Even though you are using a work computer, looking at your
work e-mail account, during work time, there is nothing your employer can
do about it. This is the process each employee must go through every day. Is
this a reasonable burden to expect all businesses to shoulder?
With the rapid growth of the Internet, electronic mail has become a con-
venient and efficient method of communicating and transacting business.
When problems arise in the context of improper use of electronic communi-
cations, including the Internet, courts have applied the common law tort of
trespass to chattels.' Under this common law doctrine, a party can be held
liable for damage caused by interfering with the private property of another.
However, a recent decision of the California Supreme Court will make it
harder to prove a trespass has occurred if the trespass is electronic because
the court has narrowly construed the injury necessary to prove this cause of
action.
The topic of this Note is the June 2003 opinion of the California Su-
preme Court in the case of Intel Corp. v. Hamidi.2 In this case, Intel Corpo-
ration ("Intel") filed an action against its disgruntled former employee, Kou-
rosh Kenneth Hamidi ("Hamidi"), after he flooded Intel's private e-mail
system with unsolicited e-mail messages to its employees on six different
occasions, despite Intel's demand that he stop.3 The trial court entered sum-
mary judgment for Intel and issued a permanent injunction restraining and
1. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Applicability of Common-Law Trespass Actions
to Electronic Communications, 107 A.L.R. 5th 549 (2003) (collecting and summarizing cases
that have determined, under state law, the applicability of common law actions for trespass to
electronic communications).
2. 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003), rev'g 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Ct. App. 2001).
3. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 246 (Ct. App. 2001).
1
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enjoining Hamidi from sending messages to Intel's employees.4 The Court
of Appeal for the Third District affirmed the trial court's grant of a perma-
nent injunction, finding that Intel had shown damage from loss of productiv-
ity caused by worker distraction and time spent trying to block the e-mails.5
The California Supreme Court reversed, finding no injury to Intel's property
or its legal interest in that property sufficient to support a trespass to chattels
claim.6 Using a narrow definition of injury, which required actual physical
damage to the computer system or impairment of its functioning, the court
refused to consider Intel's economic loss due to decreased employee produc-
tivity and significant time spent by its security personnel trying to block or
remove Hamidi's e-mail messages.7
The impact of the Intel decision on California businesses will be signifi-
cant. Regardless of ownership and accompanying responsibility, a business
will not be able to protect or control the use of its proprietary computer sys-
tems, nor the actions of employees who use those systems. This Note argues
that the California Supreme Court applied a definition of injury that is un-
workable given that the trespass was done electronically. In today's age of
electronic communication, physical damage from electronic signals that suf-
ficiently interfere with a computer system to the point where it causes a
slowdown or crash are not the only type of injury a party may suffer. Injury
sufficient for an electronic trespass to chattels claim should be more broadly
construed to include foreseeable consequential economic damages, which
are proximately caused by the trespasser. With the Internet revolution and its
accompanying host of new legal issues, the law must evolve if it is to "meet
economic, social, and scientific changes in society." 8
Using the more appropriate and broader definition of injury, Intel
proved sufficient injury to obtain relief, i.e., it sustained economic loss from
its security department employee-hours trying to block Hamidi's e-mails and
loss of employee productivity from the disruption Hamidi's numerous e-
mails caused. Hamidi had been told his e-mail was not welcome, yet he con-
tinued to evade Intel's efforts to block it. Intentional trespass such as this
should not be allowed to go unrestrained.
Part I of this Note describes the existing common and statutory law as it
relates to trespass to chattels in electronic communication and other statutory
bases for prohibiting improper electronic communications. Part II describes
the factual and procedural history of the Intel case through the trial, appellate
and supreme court decisions. Part EIl explains the theories under which
4. Id. at 247.
5. Id. at 250-52.
6. Intel, 71 P.3d at 308.
7. Id. at 307-08.
8. Id. at 330 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See also Julie Beauregard, Note, Intel Corp. v.
Hamidi: Trespassing in Cyberspace, 43 JuRAMETRics J. 483, 489-90 (2003) (arguing that the
trespass to chattels doctrine has been expanded to accommodate the lack of physical touching
and a shift in the definition of harm that is evident in a cyberspace claim).
[Vol. 40
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physical damage is not necessary to recover for trespass to chattels. Part IV
argues that Intel should have been granted relief because not only did Intel
prove it suffered injury in the form of economic damages that were related to
its chattel, Hamidi's e-mail was also prohibited by California statutory civil
and criminal laws. Moreover, the court should respect a business's legitimate
interest in protecting and controlling its assets, which must include the right
to exclude others. When proving physical injury is inappropriate because of
the electronic nature of the trespass, and when the trespasser intentionally
enters where he has been asked to leave, the court should more broadly con-
strue injury in a cyberspace trespass claim to include foreseeable consequen-
tial economic harm that is proximately caused by the trespasser's actions.
This Note concludes that Intel should have prevailed in this case of elec-
tronic trespass.
I. BACKGROUND-EXISTING LAW
A. Trespass to Chattels
Trespass to chattels is an arcane doctrine whereby one who intentionally
uses or intermeddles with personal property of another can be held liable for
that interference.9 A trespasser is liable where the "chattel is impaired as to
its condition, quality, or value" or if "harm is caused to some ... thing in
which the possessor has a legally protected interest."1 A party seeking an
injunction for trespass to chattels typically must show (1) the interference
was intentional, (2) the interference was unauthorized, and (3) the interfer-
ence proximately caused the injury."1
The right to control one's private property is deeply embedded in the
law. 2 Our system of private property ownership centers on the fundamental
right to exclude others, thereby allowing the owner to fully control the prop-
erty use.' 3 The tort of trespass to chattels parallels trespass to land in many
respects, except with regard to the harm or dispossession required to be
shown. 4 While an intentional entry upon land of another is sufficient to con-
stitute trespass whether it is harmful or not, a plaintiff is required to show le-
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217-218 (2003). "Intermeddling" means inten-
tionally bringing about a physical contact with the chattel. Id. § 217 cmt. e.
10. Id. § 218(b), (d).
11. Denise M. Howell, California High Court Complicates Control of Unwanted E-
Mails, ANDREWS COMPUTER & INTERNET LMG. REP., Nov. 18, 2003, at 10. After Intel, a tres-
pass to chattels plaintiff should also be prepared to show (1) the chattel itself suffered quanti-
fiable harm; (2) the owner instituted measures and incurred expenditures attempting to stop
the trespass and preserve the chattel's functionality; and (3) the harm to the chattel is content
neutral. Id.
12. Respondent's Brief at 9, Intel v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (No. S103781).
13. Id.
14. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OFTORTS § 60, at 124 (2001).
3
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gaily recognizable harm to prevail on a trespass to chattels claim.' 5 Harm
can be shown by: (1) actual dispossession, (2) loss of use for a substantial
time, (3) impairment in the condition, quality or value of the chattel, or (4)
harm to the possessor or to someone or something in which the possessor
has a legally protected interest.'
6
A plaintiff can recover on the theory of trespass to chattels where the in-
terference with personal property possession is "not sufficiently important to
be classed as conversion, and so to compel the defendant to pay the full
value of the thing with which he has interfered."' 7 Yet, courts have found
that any unlawful interference, however slight, with the enjoyment by an-
other of that person's personal property, can be sufficient for trespass. 8 In
modem American law, "[t]respass remains as an occasional remedy for mi-
nor interferences, resulting in some damage. 19
More recently, courts have started to adapt this doctrine, originally de-
veloped to protect physical property, in the context of cyberspace to put a
stop to commercial spam, spiders, and automatic programs that are unwel-
come and potentially damaging.20 California courts have found that elec-
tronic signals generated and sent by a computer are sufficiently physically
tangible to support a trespass to chattels cause of action.2'
B. Unwelcome E-mail-Spam
The general public's frustration with receiving an increasing number of
unsolicited e-mail messages has prompted thirty-six states to enact laws
governing unsolicited bulk and/or commercial e-mail (spam22), primarily
within the last four years. 23 While California has not yet adopted legislation
15. Id.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 9, § 218; see also DOBBS, supra note
14, at 124.
17. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 85-86
(5th ed. 1984). Prosser & Keeton refer to trespass to chattels as the "little brother of conver-
sion." Id.
18. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 16 (2003).
19. KEETON, supra note 17, § 15, at 90 (emphasis added).
20. Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421,421 (2002).
21. See, e.g., Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Ct. App. 1996);
CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (ap-
plying California law).
22. Use of the term "spam" as Internet jargon for unsolicited bulk e-mail (or "junk
mail"), either commercial or non-commercial, "arose out of a skit by the British comedy
troupe Monty Python, in which a waitress can offer a patron no single menu item that does
not include spain: 'Well, there's spain, egg, sausage and spain. That's not got much spain in
it.' ... Hormel Foods Corporation, which debuted its SPAM® luncheon meat in 1937, has
dropped any defensiveness about this use of the term and now celebrates its product with a
website (www.spam.com)." State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 406 n.1 (Wash. 2001) (citations
omitted).
23. See David E. Sorkin, Spam Laws, at http://www.spamlaws.com/state/summary.html
[Vol. 40
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that regulates unsolicited bulk electronic communication, it does regulate
unsolicited commercial e-mail advertising? Sections 17538.4 and 17538.45
of the Business and Professions Code regulate the conduct of persons and
entities doing business in California who electronically transmit unsolicited
advertising materials.'
Section 17538.4 requires that a "person or entity conducting business in
this state" who causes an unsolicited e-mail document to be sent (1) establish
a toll-free telephone number or valid sender operated return e-mail address
that recipients may use to notify the sender not to e-mail further unsolicited
documents; (2) include as the first text in the e-mailed document a statement
informing the recipient of the toll-free number or return address that may be
used to notify the sender not to e-mail any further unsolicited material;
(3) not send any further unsolicited advertising material to anyone who has
(last visited Jan. 30, 2004) (collecting and summarizing current state laws regulating spam).
State laws typically require a combination of: (1) truth-in-routing information, (2) an opt-out
mechanism, (3) labeling requirements, and (4) truth-in-subject lines. Bruce E.H. Johnson, Is
There a Constitutional Right to Bombard the Public With Penis Enlargement Proposals?, 21-
SUM COMM. LAW. 3, 5 (2003). Remedies typically include statutory damages per e-mail and
a private right of action. Id.
24. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4 (West 2003), repealed by 2003 Cal. Stat.
487, S.B. 186, 2003 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (approved Sept. 23, 2003; to have been effective
Jan. 1, 2004), and CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45 (West 2003), amended by 2003 Cal.
Stat. 487, Cal. S.B. 186 (approved Sept. 23, 2003; to have been effective Jan. 1, 2004); see
also Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 260 (Ct. App. 2002). Section
17538.4 states that it will become inoperative upon the enactment of a federal law that prohib-
its or regulates unsolicited advertising by electronic mail. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
17538.4(i).
California anti-spain laws have been recently preempted by a new federal regime aimed at
regulating spam e-mail. See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Mar-
keting (CAN-SPAM) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (approved Dec. 16,
2003; effective Jan. 1, 2004) (codified partially at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2003)). The
CAN-SPAM Act preempts state laws that regulate commercial e-mail messages, except to the
extent they prohibit false or deceptive practices, but leaves intact state law claims not specific
to electronic mail, including trespass, contract, and tort law claims. 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b).
Highlights of the CAN-SPAM Act include the requirement that unsolicited commercial e-
mail messages be labeled (although not by a standard method) and include opt-out instruc-
tions and the sender's physical address. See David E. Sorkin, CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, at
http://www.spamlaws.com/federal/summ108.html#s877 (last visited Jan. 30, 2004) (collect-
ing and summarizing proposed and enacted federal laws regulating spam). The Act "prohibits
the use of deceptive subject lines and false headers." Id. The Act also empowers the Federal
Trade Commission (but does not require it) to establish a "do-not-email" registry. Id.
This Note discusses the California anti-spain laws in effect at the time the Intel action arose.
Therefore, the CAN-SPAM Act that was adopted as this Note was being finalized is outside
the scope of this Note.
25. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17538.4, 17538.45; see Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
260. "Unsolicited e-mailed documents" are defined as "any e-mailed document or documents
consisting of advertising material for the lease, sale, rental, gift offer, or other disposition of
any realty, goods, services, or extension of credit" that are (a) addressed to a recipient who
does not have an existing business or personal relationship with the e-mail initiator, and (b)
not sent at the request of or with the express consent of the recipient. CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 17538.4(e); see Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 17538.45(a)(2). 5
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requested that such material not be sent; and (4) include in the subject line of
each e-mail message "ADV:" as the first four characters or "ADV:ADLT" if
the advertisement pertains to adult material.26 Section 17538.4 applies to any
unsolicited e-mailed documents that are delivered to a California resident via
an electronic mail service provider's equipment located in California.27 The
state may bring a civil action against anyone who violates this section, seek-
ing a maximum penalty of $2,500 per violation.28
Section 17538.45 further prohibits any person or entity from sending
unsolicited e-mail advertisements through an electronic mail service pro-
vider's California equipment in violation of the mail service provider's pol-
icy.29 In addition to any other remedies available, Section 17538.45 allows
the electronic mail service provider to bring a civil action to recover the
greater of actual damages or liquidated damages of $50 per message, up to a
maximum of $25,000.30 The prevailing party may also recover reasonable
attorneys' fees.3 '
Recognizing that spain is not only an annoyance, but also a drain on
corporate budgets and a threat to the continued usefulness of e-mail commu-
nication, the California Legislature recently bolstered its regulation of spam
to be effective in 2004.32 The California Legislature found that: (a) spam
comprised forty percent of all e-mail traffic in the United States, and experts
predicted that this would increase to over fifty percent by the end of 2003,
and (b) spam would cost U.S. companies an estimated $10 billion dollars in
2003, with California companies shouldering $1.2 billion of that amount.33
In addition to the cost to companies, spain imposes a cost on users by taking
26. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4(a)-(g); see Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260.
27. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4(d). "Electronic mail service provider" is defined
as "any business or organization qualified to do business in this state that provides individu-
als, corporations, or other entities the ability to send or receive electronic mail through
equipment located in this state and that is an intermediary in sending or receiving electronic
mail." Id.; Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260; see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 17438.45(a)(3).
28. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17536 (West 2003).
29. Id. § 17538.45(c).
30. Id. § 17538.45(f)(1).
31. Id. § 17538.45(f)(2).
32. See Cal. S.B. 186 (approved Sept. 23, 2003, effective Jan. 1, 2004, amending §
17538.45 and adding Article 1.8 (commencing with § 17529) to Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Divi-
sion 7, and repealing § 17538.4).
33. Cal. S.B. 186, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17529(a), (d) (West 2003). See also Saul
Hansell, Internet is Losing Ground in Battle Against Spam, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 2003, at Al
(reporting that unsolicited e-mail currently constitutes 45% of all e-mail). Costs relating to
spam stem from: decreased productivity, additional equipment, software, time needed to de-
lete unwanted e-mail messages, server crashes, higher cost of Internet access due to disk
space charges and connect time, and increased costs for ISPs to transmit spam that are passed
along to subscribers. See Cal. S.B. 186; see also Online Advertising Legal Issues, Spain E-
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up valuable storage space in e-mail in-boxes, using costly computer, network
and server bandwidth, and discouraging people from using e-mail.
34
California's new law prohibits unsolicited commercial e-mail from be-
ing sent either from or to a California e-mail address, unless the sender has a
preexisting or current business relationship with the recipient, or unless the
sender first receives the recipient's direct, opt-in consent. 35 In addition to
other remedies available at law, the recipient, an electronic mail service pro-
vider, or the state attorney general may bring an action against the sender to
recover either or both (a) actual damages or (b) liquidated damages of
$1,000 per e-mail, up to $1 million per incident.36 The prevailing plaintiff
can also recover reasonable attorneys' fees and CoStS. 37
C. Criminal Penalties
In addition to civil remedies, criminal penalties exist in California for
the knowing and unauthorized use of computer time, data processing, stor-
age functions or other use of a computer, computer system, or computer
network.38 Penalties for a violation where the value of computer services
misappropriated is less than $400 include a fine not exceeding $5,000 or im-
prisonment not exceeding one year, or both.39 Penalties for a violation that
results in victim expenditure of more than $5,000, or where the value of
computer services misappropriated is more than $400, include a fine not ex-
ceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding three years, or both.' The
statute also prohibits the knowing and unauthorized use of an Internet do-
main name of any other individual, corporation or entity to send an e-mail
that causes damage.4" An injured party who suffers damage or loss because
34. Cal. S.B. 186, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17529(e).
35. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17529.1-17529.2. "California e-mail address" is defined
as (1) an e-mail address furnished by an electronic mail service provider that sends bills for
maintaining that account to a mailing address in California, (2) an e-mail address ordinarily
accessed from a computer located in California, or (3) an e-mail address furnished to a resi-
dent of California. Id. § 17529.1(b)(l)-(3). "Preexisting or current business relationship"
means that "the recipient has made an inquiry and has provided his or her e-mail address, or
has made an application, purchase, or transaction, with or without consideration, regarding
products or services offered by the advertiser." Id. § 17529.1(1). Unsolicited "commercial e-
mail advertisement" is defined as "any electronic mail message initiated for the purpose of
advertising or promoting the lease, sale, rental, gift offer, or other disposition of any property,
goods, services, or extension of credit." Id. § 17529.1(c).
36. Cal. S.B. 186, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17529.8(a)(1).
37. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17529.8(a)(2).
38. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 502(b)(4), (c)(3), (e)(1) (West 2003).
39. Id. § 502(d)(2)(A).
40. Id. § 502(d)(2)(B).
41. Id. § 502(c)(9). Penalties for violating this section include a fine not exceeding
$1,000 for a first violation that does not result in injury, and a fine not exceeding $5,000 or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. Id. § 502(d)(5). 7
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of unauthorized computer use can bring a civil action against the violator for
compensatory damages and injunctive or other equitable relief.4 2
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual History
After being discharged by Intel,43 Hamidi and others "formed an organi-
zation named Former and Current Employees of Intel (FACE-Intel) to dis-
seminate information and views critical of Intel's employment and personnel
policies and practices."" FACE-Intel4 5 maintained a Web site' identifying
Hamidi as the Webmaster and organization's spokesperson for the purpose
of publicizing such material.47
While there was no evidence presented at the summary judgment hear-
ing that Hamidi had breached Intel's security system, Hamidi did state he
obtained Intel's employee e-mail directory from a floppy disk anonymously
sent to him." He then sent mass e-mails to as many as 35,000 Intel employ-
ees on six specific occasions over a twenty-one-month period.49 The e-mails
criticized Intel's employment practices, warned employees that Intel's prac-
42. Id. § 502(e)(1). Compensatory damages include the injured party's expenditures that
are reasonably and necessarily incurred to verify that the computer system, computer network,
computer program, or data were not altered, damaged, or deleted. Id.
43. Intel was founded in 1968 to build semiconductor products and introduced the
world's first microprocessor in 1971. Intel Corp., Intel Corporate Overview, at
http://www.intel.compressroom/CorpOverview.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004). Intel supplies
the computer and communications industries with chips, boards, systems, and software build-
ing blocks to create advanced computing and communications systems. Id. "Intel's mission is
to be the preeminent building block supplier to the Internet economy." Id. It employs 78,000
people, has revenues of $26.7 billion (2002), and is ranked 65 by Fortune 500 Magazine. Intel
Corp., About Intel, at http://www.intel.com/intel/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). After
his discharge, Hamidi brought unsuccessful actions against Intel for wrongful termination and
workers compensation. Respondent's Brief at 6, Intel v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (No.
S103781). Based on the Worker's Compensation Appeals Board findings that Hamidi had
been untruthful, it denied his claim for employment-related damages to his "psyche." Id.
44. Intel, 71 P.3d at 301.
45. FACE-Intel's mission is "To influence positive human resource policies and prac-
tices and create true long-term employment opportunities at Intel. To influence Intel to abol-
ish its predatory Ranking and Rating system and replace it with a true performance review
system, which [should] only be based on merits of employees performance. To influence Intel
to stop age, disability, gender, race, and ethnicity discriminations." FACE-Intel, Who We Are,
at http://www.faceintel.com/whoweare.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
46. The purpose of FACE-Intel's website is to "identify, alert and rally Intel (and other
electronic industry) employees so as to educate them as to the unsavory and discriminatory
practices described [on FACE-Intel's websitel that have been perpetrated on [them] and may
be perpetrated on them in the days, months and years to come," and "to educate these indi-
viduals on how to survive downsizing and redeployment." FACE-Intel, Who We Are, at
http://www.faceintel.com/whoweare.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
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tices posed a danger to their careers, suggested employees move to other
companies, solicited employees to participate in FACE-Intel, and urged em-
ployees to visit FACE-Intel's website.50 The messages were calculated to
upset Intel employees and disrupt company morale.5 ' The messages stated
that FACE-Intel would remove an employee from its mailing list upon re-
quest, and 450 employees so notified FACE-Intel. 2 Intel's computer use
policy limited use of the e-mail system to company business. 3
When Intel demanded in writing in March 1998 that Hamidi stop send-
ing e-mails to Intel's computer system, Hamidi asserted he had a right to do
so and sent a new mass mailing in September 1998.5' Although Intel was
able to block some of the messages, Hamidi admitted he intentionally
evaded Intel's security measures by using different sending computers.5
While Intel did not present evidence that the receipt or internal distribution
of Hamidi's electronic messages damaged its computer system or slowed or
impaired its functioning, Intel did present evidence that many of its em-
ployee recipients asked the company to stop the messages.56 Additionally,
the company was impacted economically by the loss of productivity caused
by the thousands of employees who were distracted from their work and by
the significant time its security department spent trying to halt the distrac-
tions.5 7
B. Procedural History
1. Trial and Appellate Court Decisions
When Hamidi refused to comply with Intel's request to stop invading its
internal, proprietary e-mail system, Intel sued Hamidi and FACE-Intel,
pleading causes of action for trespass to chattels and nuisance and seeking
both actual damages and an injunction against the unwanted e-mail.5 8 Intel
later voluntarily dismissed its nuisance claim and waived its demand for
damages, and the trial court entered default judgment against FACE-Intel for
its failure to answer. 5' The court granted Intel's motion for summary judg-
ment permanently enjoining Hamidi, FACE-Intel, and their agents "from
50. Id.
51. Respondent's Brief at 6, Intel (No. S103781). The messages stated that employees on
redeployment were being targeted for termination and no jobs would be available for them.
Id.
52. Intel, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.
53. Id. at 246.
54. Intel, 71 P.3d at 301.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Intel, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250.
58. Intel, 71 P.3d at 301.
59. Id. See Intel v. Hamidi, No. 98AS05067, 1999 WL 450944, at *1 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999). 9
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sending unsolicited e-mail to addresses on Intel's computer systems."'
Hamidi appealed the summary judgment order but FACE-Intel did not.6'
The California Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the judgment in
a two-one decision, concluding that Intel had demonstrated its entitlement to
an injunction based on a theory of trespass to chattels.62 The appellate court
reasoned that even if Intel did not demonstrate "sufficient harm to trigger an
entitlement to nominal damages," Intel had shown that Hamidi's conduct
was trespassory, Hamidi had disrupted Intel's business by using its private
property, and Intel was therefore entitled to the injunction.63 The court
pointed out that Hamidi was not being enjoined "from sending e-mail over
the internet to Intel employees," as he had incorrectly asserted in his brief.'
The court stated that he was "free to send mail-'e' or otherwise-to the
homes of Intel employees," and that the injunction simply required that he
air his views without using Intel's private property. 65
Hamidi acknowledged Intel's right to self-help, and in response to his
urging that Intel could have taken further steps to fend off his e-mails, the
court reasoned that because Hamidi had shown he would try to evade Intel's
security, there was "no public benefit from this wasteful cat-and-mouse
game which justifies depriving Intel of an injunction." The court stated that
even if a company could not precisely measure the harm resulting from an
unwelcome intrusion, the fact that the intrusion occurs may nevertheless
support a claim for trespass to chattels.6 7 As other California cases have held,
the court found that electronic signals generated by a computer system could
be "sufficiently tangible" to support a trespass cause of action, regardless of
whether they caused physical harm.68
The court also held that the injunction did not violate Hamidi's free
speech rights under either the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or
article I, section 2, subsection (a) of the California Constitution, finding that
judicial enforcement of neutral trespass laws at the bequest of a private
property owner did not constitute state action.69 It further held that an action
to halt expressive activity on private property did not contravene the Califor-
nia Constitution unless the property is freely open to the public, and found
private e-mail servers differed from the Internet because they are not tradi-
60. Intel, 71 P.3d at 301-02.
61. ld. at 302.
62. Intel, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252.
63. Id. at 249.
64. Id. at 258.
65. Id.
66. ld. at 249.
67. Id. (citing Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (applying New York law, based on the Restatement, holding "evidence of mere posses-
sory interference is sufficient to demonstrate the quantum of harm necessary to establish a
claim for trespass to chattels.")).
68. Id. at 251.
69. ld. at 254-55.
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tional public forums.7° Like its factories and hallways, telephones and manu-
facturing equipment, Intel owns and has a right to control its e-mail system,
and "[n]o citizen has the general right to enter a private business and pester
an employee trying to work.
71
2. California Supreme Court Decision
In a four-three decision, the California Supreme Court reversed, holding
(a) the tort of trespass to chattels did "not encompass, and should not be ex-
tended to encompass, an electronic communication that neither damages the
recipient computer system nor impairs its functioning;" (b) the temporary
use of Intel's computer processors and storage of Hamidi's e-mail messages
did not constitute a trespass because it did not interfere with Intel's "use or
possession of, or any other legally protected interest in" its computer system;
and (c) the consequential economic damage Intel claimed was "not an injury
to the company's interest in its computers[,] which worked as intended and
were unharmed by the communications."72 Having concluded that trespass to
chattels was not shown, the court did not address at length the freedom of
speech constitutional issues.73 However, it did posit that "[e]ven assuming a
corporate employer could under some circumstances have claimed a per-
sonal" constitutional "right not to listen," Hamidi did not violate that right
because his messages were sent to "individual Intel employees, rather than
Intel itself."74
The court reasoned that "in order to obtain injunctive relief the plaintiff
must ordinarily show that the defendant's wrongful acts threaten to cause ir-
reparable injuries" that were not capable of being "adequately compensated
in damages."75 Applying this test, the court found that Hamidi had not used
the system in a manner "in which it was not intended to function or impaired
the system in any way," nor did Hamidi fail to honor employee requests to
be removed from FACE-Intel's mailing list.
76
In response to Intel's contention that "while its computers were not
damaged... its interest in the 'physical condition, quality or value' of the
computers was harmed," the court distinguished Hamidi's actions from a
line of cases relied on by Intel, including a series of federal district court de-
cisions holding that unsolicited bulk e-mail sent through an Internet service
70. Id. at 256-57.
71. Id. at 257-58.
72. Intel, 71 P.3d at 300.
73. Id. at 311.
74. Id. at 312. The court noted that dissenting Justice Brown's rationale of a "right not to
listen," based on the listener's "personal autonomy," would in any event support only a nar-
row injunction aimed at protecting the individual recipients who objected to receiving the
messages, rather than a broad injunction against communication with all Intel employees. Id.
75. Id. at 303; see 5 WITKIN, CAL. PRocEDuRE § 782, at 239 (4th ed. 1997).
76. Intel, 71 P.3d at 304.
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provider's equipment constituted trespass to the ISP's computer system.7
The court emphasized the actual or threatened interference with the com-
puter's functioning that was present in the distinguished cases, but was ab-
sent from Intel's case." The court also distinguished a more recent line of
district court decisions where unauthorized robotic data collection from a
company's publicly accessible website was found to be a trespass because of
the harmful impact the activity could have on the functioning of the com-
puter equipment, especially if replicated by other searchers.79
The court disagreed that Intel's interest in its employee productivity,
which was disrupted by Hamidi's messages, was a legally protected interest
in its computer systems that was comparable to the loss of business reputa-
tion, customer goodwill, and employee time found in CompuServe Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc. and its progeny."0 Citing several sources that have
questioned whether the economic injuries identified in CompuServe were
sufficiently connected to the personal property, 8' the court found that Intel's
injuries were even less connected. 2 While CompuServe's customers were
annoyed because they were inundated with spam, which made use for per-
sonal communication more difficult and costly, the court stated this related
to the functioning of CompuServe's electronic mail system.8 3 In contrast, the
court concluded that Intel's workers were distracted from their work not be-
cause of the frequency or quantity of Hamidi's messages, but because of the
assertions and opinions the messages conveyed, making Intel's complaint
about the contents of the messages rather than the functioning of the e-mail
77. Id. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Ct. App.1996);
CompuServe Inc., v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021-23 (S.D. Ohio 1997);
Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 1998 WL 388389, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (applying
California law); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (E.D. Va. 1998) (apply-
ing Virginia law); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451-52 (E.D. Va.
1998) (applying Virginia law).
78. Intel, 71 P.3d at 304.
79. Id. at 305. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (applying California law), and Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F.
Supp. 2d 238, 248-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying New York law). But cf. Ticketmaster Corp.
v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 WL 1887522, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (applying California law)
(finding no trespass where defendant's comparative use was very small and there was no
showing that the use interfered with plaintiff's regular business).
80. Intel, 71 P.3d at 307 (citing CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1023; Hotmail, 1998 WL
388389, at *7; Am. Online, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 550). In CompuServe, the defendant advertising
company sent hundreds of thousands of unsolicited e-mail advertisements on behalf of them-
selves and their clients to Internet users, many of whom were CompuServe subscribers. 962
F. Supp. at 1017. Despite CompuServe's attempts to block the e-mail and its demands to
cease and desist, the defendant sent an increasing volume of e-mail, which placed a signifi-
cant burden on CompuServe's equipment and caused complaints from its subscribers threat-
ening to discontinue their subscriptions. Id. at 1017-19. The court granted CompuServe an
injunction enjoining the defendant from sending further unsolicited e-mail. Id. at 1028.
81. Intel, 71 P.3d at 307 (citing Quilter, supra note 20, at 429-30, and Dan L. Burk, The
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system."4 Believing that Intel sought to extend CompuServe's economic in-
jury rationale to include the injurious effect of a communication's contents
on its recipients, rather than the economic harm it suffered by transmission
of the message through its system, the court refused to find Intel had suf-
fered an impairment to the quality or value of its computer system.
85
While observing that academia has debated the viability of creating an
absolute property right to exclude undesired communications, which may
force spammers to internalize the costs they impose on ISPs and their cus-
tomers, the court noted that such a property rule might also create substantial
new costs in lost ease and openness of communication and in lost network
benefits.86 The Intel court deferred to the Legislature on the appropriateness
of regulating non-commercial e-mail and other unwanted contact between
computers on the Internet, and ultimately reversed the court of appeals deci-
sion. 87 The court held that Intel's claim for trespass to chattels was not ac-
tionable because Intel's consequential damages in the form of economic loss
from decreased employee productivity and security personnel time were not
sufficient to show actual or threatened injury to its computer system or its
legally protected interest.88 Because Intel's injury arose from disruption or
distraction caused to its employees by the contents of Hamidi's e-mail mes-
sages, the court found Intel's injury was entirely separate from, and did not
directly affect, the possession or value of its computer system.89 The court
held that Intel was, therefore, not entitled to summary judgment.'
84. Id.
85. Intel, 71 P.3d at 307-08.
86. Id. at 310-11. On the one hand, amicus curiae Professor Epstein of the University of
Chicago analogized cyberspace trespass to real property trespass (a company's computer
server is its castle) and argued for computer server inviolability, predicting that allowing a
website owner to deny access to a particular sending computer would simply lead to a market
solution of individual licensing. Id. at 309-10. On the other hand, Professor Lemley of the
University of California, Berkeley, argued that freedom of electronic communication would
be reduced if each user was required to get advance permission from anyone with whom they
wanted to communicate and anyone who owns the server through which their message must
travel. Id. at 310. Professor Lessig of Stanford University argued that "[i]f machines must ne-
gotiate before entering any individual site, then the costs of using the network climb." ld. at
310-11 (quoting Lessig, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD 171 (2001)).
87. Id. at 311.
88. ld. The court noted that its holding was not intended to affect the legal remedies of
Internet service providers against senders of unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail, where the
primary complaint was that the extraordinary quantity of e-mail had impaired the computer
system's functioning by overburdening the ISP's own computers and making the entire com-
puter system harder to use for the ISP's customers. ld. at 300.
89. Id. at 300-01.
90. Id. at 311.
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III. PHYSICAL INJURY IS NOT NECESSARY TO PROVE
TRESPASS TO CHATTELS
Intel was denied relief on the theory that it failed to establish actual in-
jury to its property.9 However, the rule requiring a showing of actual injury
pertains to the award of damages, which Intel was not requesting, and there
is no such showing required when a court is being asked to grant equitable
relief against an intrusion.92 In addition to instances where an injured party
has proven physical harm to the chattel, an injured party can seek redress for
a trespass to chattels claim where there is a repeated trespass, where the tres-
pass threatens injury, or the trespass disrupts business. Judicial enforcement
of a trespass claim should not be limited to instances where physical injury
has occurred.9 3 Equitable relief in the form of an injunction can be appropri-
ate without a showing of actual physical harm.94
A. Repeated Trespass Can be Enjoined
The right to exclude is an important property right. Creative individuals
will be less inclined to develop intellectual property if they cannot limit the
terms of its transmission.95 It is irrelevant that Hamidi offered to remove
employees from his e-mail list after his act of trespass was complete. His
communications were unwelcome, and Intel, the owner of the equipment he
used to facilitate their dissemination, told him so. While it may not have af-
fected the performance of Intel's system because Intel is one of the world's
largest computer companies, Hamidi's repeated mass mailings took up valu-
able processing power and space on Intel's system that could not be other-
wise used by Intel.
The victim of an ongoing trespass could be irreparably harmed if the
courts do not grant injunctive relief. For example, in Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc.,96 the plaintiff obtained an injunction barring a competitor from
using search spiders to cull names from its general customer list (previously
provided under license), after Register.com had withdrawn its consent for
the defendant to review and revise the list. 7 The court found that mere pos-
sessory interference by defendant's search engines and use of Register.com's
computer system capacity were sufficient to show the irreparable harm nec-
91. Id. at 318 (Brown, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 323. But see Tyson Marshall, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels, the
Internet's Greatest Antagonist?, 40 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 461, 479 (2003) (arguing the con-
trary).
94. Intel, 71 P.3d at 325.
95. Id.
96. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
97. Id. at 248-52.
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essary for Register.com to prevail on its request for injunctive relief.98 The
court noted that in the absence of an injunction, Register.com had a valid
fear that its servers could be flooded with search robots deployed by other
competitors. 99
Similarly, in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.,' ° the plaintiff obtained
an injunction based on a trespass to chattels claim preventing an online auc-
tion aggregating site from using a program to conduct automated searches of
eBay's site, without permission, in order to report pricing information.' 01
The court found that (1) the defendant intentionally and without authoriza-
tion interfered with eBay's possessory interest in its computer system, (2) it
was likely that eBay would prevail on the merits of its trespass claim be-
cause defendant's activities had diminished the quality or value of eBay's
computer system, and there was a possibility that it would suffer irreparable
harm, and (3) the public interest did not weigh against granting a preliminary
injunction. 10 2
If we allow non-commercial unsolicited and unwelcome communica-
tions to be sent, despite the recipient's ineffective efforts to block them, the
victim is left with no effective remedy. Virtually everyone would agree: re-
ceiving numerous telephone calls or faxes is harassment when the recipient
has told the sender to stop and expends all efforts to block the incoming
messages. An invisible line is crossed and the actions become a trespass, en-
titling the plaintiff to relief. Intel took the correct steps in seeking judicial re-
lief when its efforts at self-help were ineffective. If the judiciary does not
stand behind a victim who seeks legal redress for an invasion of its property,
then we force that private party to make escalating self-help efforts with an
outer limit that may be unacceptable. This is not the model our society is
built upon. Despite Intel's request that he stop, Hamidi persisted. The court
leaves Intel with no effective remedy.
Enormous amounts of unwanted paper mail can create a concrete poten-
tial harm that our courts are willing to recognize. 13 Mail sent after the re-
cipient has requested the sender stop creates the additional burden on the re-
cipient of scrutinizing the mail for objectionable material and exposes the
recipient to possible harassment. 1" In Tillman v. Distribution Systems of
America,105 the court enjoined the unwanted delivery of newspapers onto a
homeowner's property after the sender had been requested to stop.106 While
98. Id. at 250-5 1.
99. Id. at 251.
100. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
101. Id. at 1064-72.
102. Id. at 1070-73.
103. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (rejecting mass
mailer's argument that a vendor has a constitutional right to send unwanted material to the
home of another, after being asked to stop).
104. Id. at 735.
105. 648 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
106. See Intel, 71 P.3d at 320-21 (Brown, J., dissenting) (citing Tillman, 648 N.Y.S.2d at
15
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the Tillman court did not quantify the damage created by the unwanted de-
livery, it stated that the homeowner was neither required to let unwanted
newspapers accumulate, nor expend time and energy to gather and dispose
of them. 107
Intel's employees were burdened by having to read and deal with
Hamidi's messages, which were sent even though he was asked to stop. Like
Tillman, the damage created by Hamidi's repeated unwanted e-mails need
not be quantified to be enjoined. Intel's employees should not be required to
spend their time and energy to read and deal with Hamidi's repeated e-mails,
nor should they have to let them accumulate in their in-box. Hamidi's ac-
tions were a repeated trespass, capable of being enjoined irrespective of
quantifiable physical injury.
B. Trespass That Only Threatens Injury can be Enjoined
Hamidi's intangible trespass was potentially damaging. Injunctive relief
is appropriate where the defendant's wrongful act constitutes an actual or
threatened injury to property or personal rights.10 8 Courts have agreed that
trespass which only threatens injury can nonetheless be enjoined. In Compu-
Serve, the court held that CompuServe could sustain an action for trespass to
chattels without showing a substantial interference with its right to posses-
sion of that chattel.109 In Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek,110 the court held that
the parents of a minor were liable to a long-distance telephone company for
trespass to personal property when their son used confidential codes to gain
access to the company's computer system and tie up the system in an effort
to crack the access and authorization codes to make long-distance telephone
calls without paying for them."'
Intel was not seeking monetary damages; it was seeking only to prevent
Hamidi from sending his unwanted messages. Not only did Hamidi's actions
cause Intel to suffer real economic loss, Hamidi's mass mailings threatened
injury to Intel's computer system. If Hamidi was allowed to send his bulk
unsolicited e-mail, other private parties could do the same, and before long,
Intel's private business e-mail system could be filled with unsolicited, non-
business spain e-mail, causing it to slow or crash. The system's usefulness as
a critical business tool would then be significantly impacted. As Justice
Mosk argues in his dissent, "[tihe majority leave Intel, which has exercised
636).
107. Tillman, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 636. The Tillman court upheld the plaintiffs right to pre-
vent the mail delivery, regardless of whether his objection was due to the quantity (volume) or
quality (content) of the messages. Id.
108. See WrrKiN, supra note 75, at 239.
109. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
110. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996).
111. Id. at 472-73.
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all reasonable self-help efforts, with no recourse unless [Hamidi] causes a
malfunction or systems 'crash.""' 12 Given Hamidi's persistence and his
proven ability to circumvent their security measures, Intel had a legitimate
concern that his trespass threatened damage to their business property.
C. Disruption of Business can be Enjoined
Contrary to the court's ultimate conclusion, it was not the contents of
Hamidi's e-mails to which Intel objected-it was the disruption and eco-
nomic loss of productivity they caused to Intel's business. The majority fo-
cuses on the content of Hamidi's messages rather than his repeated trespass
and directs Intel to seek relief through content-based speech tort. However,
Intel's action was not premised on an objection to the content of his mes-
sages." 3 Intel did not seek to prevent him from expressing his ideas on the
FACE-Intel web site, through private paper or electronic mail to employees'
homes, or from picketing or posting billboards." 4 Intel only objected to
Hamidi's use of Intel's private property to advance his message." 5 Intel ex-
perienced financial loss from its employee confusion and distraction in read-
ing and dealing with the multiple unwanted e-mails and from its security
personnels' efforts to block the e-mails, all paid for ultimately by Intel.
The supreme court majority agreed with the dissenting justice below
who posited that, "if a chattel's receipt of an electronic communication con-
stitutes a trespass to that chattel, then not only are unsolicited telephone calls
and faxes trespasses to chattel, but unwelcome radio waves and television
signals also constitute a trespass to chattel."'1 6 But this analogy is flawed be-
cause it is missing an essential element: consent.' 7 The paradigm shifts from
"unwelcome" to "unauthorized" once the defendant has been told to keep off
or leave. 18 When Intel demanded that Hamidi stop, his e-mails shifted from
being not only unsolicited and unwelcome, but to being unauthorized. This
is an essential point that the majority does not address when they instead fo-
cus on the lack of physical damage to Intel's computer system and the un-
welcome contents of Hamidi's messages. However, this critical distinction
112. Intel, 71 P.3d at 326 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
113. But that is not to say that Intel would not have a right to object to his messages. The
appellate court observed, "Intel has the right to exclude others from speaking on its property.
Intel is not required to exercise its right in a 'content-neutral' fashion. Content discrimination
is part of a private property-owner's bundle of rights." Intel, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255.
114. Intel, 71 P.3d at 313 (Brown, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 308.
117. See Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. Cmi. L. REv. 73, 85 (2003) (arguing
that the common law doctrine of trespass to chattels is adaptable to a cyberspace claim).
118. See id. The author explains that while "[tihere are lots of phone calls and faxes that
we would rather not receive," there are "few that we have forbidden." Id. Those unwelcome
advances may be reason for rebuff, but once that rebuff comes, the defendant has crossed the
line and no longer holds an implied license to communicate with the recipient. Id. 17
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that Intel repeatedly demanded that he stop, and took all self-help efforts in
its power, addresses the court's concern about the gray line between an unso-
licited/unwelcome communication and an unauthorized trespass.
Although the court acknowledges that Intel has the right to use self-help
to preclude Hamidi's e-mail, it refuses a corresponding request for injunctive
relief when that self-help is ineffective. Hamidi sent his bulk mail through
Intel's "proprietary computer system, using Intel's confidential employee e-
mail lists and by adopting a series of different origination addresses and en-
coding strategies to elude Intel's blocking efforts.' 19 Like the situation in
which Intel found itself, this leaves a business in a powerless position, open
to the whim of whoever wants to take advantage of that privately-owned
business property for their own use. Our society does not support this "free
rider" concept."
Moreover, Hamidi did not use a "public commons" or "town square of
the Internet" for his messages, but he used instead Intel's private, proprietary
property. 2 ' He directed his messages to a specific subset of individuals, with
whom he had no current relationship. He did not communicate in such a way
that anyone other than his target audience could hear or receive his message.
Justice Mosk aptly cites an analogy that Hamidi's actions were "more like
intruding into a private office mailroom, commandeering the mail cart, and
dropping off unwanted broadsides on 30,000 desks." 22
IV. INTEL WAS ENTITLED TO RELIEF
The appellate court injunction was properly granted to restrain Hamidi's
actions because Intel suffered actual injury in the form of economic harm,
which was proximately caused by the disruption of its business and loss of
employee time and productivity. Moreover, there is a sufficient nexus be-
tween this injury and Intel's interest in its computer system. A business's
right to protect and control its assets should include the right to exclude oth-
ers, even in cyberspace, who seek to expropriate those business assets for
their own personal use.
In addition to trespassing on Intel's computer system, Hamidi's actions
arguably violated California anti-spam and computer crime laws. The Intel
case points out the "crack in the armor" of a trespass to chattels claim in cy-
berspace. Physical injury can be very difficult to prove when the communi-
cation is through mysterious electronic impulses; in that instance, the court
should also consider foreseeable economic harm that is proximately caused
by the sender's actions.
119. Intel, 71 P.3d at 326 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 325-26.
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A. Intel Suffered Injury in the Form of Economic Harm
"The harm necessary to trigger liability for trespass to chattels can
be... harm to something other than the chattel itself." '23 Harm sufficient for
a trespass claim can come in many forms. For example, in Thrifty-Tel, the
plaintiff's computer system was so overburdened that some subscribers were
denied access to phone lines. 2a
In CompuServe, multiple e-mailings drained disk space and processing
power, depriving CompuServe's other subscribers from using those re-
sources.'25 In America Online, Inc. v. IMS,12 6 the plaintiff's business good-
will and its possessory interest in its computer network were diminished
when the defendant, after receiving a cease-and-desist letter, sent 60 million
unauthorized advertisements to America Online's subscribers over a 10-
month period.'27
Lastly, in Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc.,' 28 the plaintiff, a pro-
vider of free Internet e-mail service, obtained an injunction against a defen-
dant who sent spam and pornography to Hotmail subscribers in violation of
their mail service agreement.' 29 As a result of the defendant falsifying its re-
turn address, Hotmail was inundated with responses to the spam, including
complaints from its subscribers and "bounced back" e-mails sent by defen-
dant to nonexistent or incorrect e-mail addresses. 3 ° The court found that the
e-mails took up a substantial amount of finite computer space and threatened
to damage Hotmail's ability to service its legitimate customers, caused Hot-
mail to incur added costs for personnel to sort through and respond to the




123. DOBBS, supra note 14, at 124-25 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra
note 9, § 218(d) cmt. j).
124. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 471 (Ct. App. 1996); but cf.
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 WL 1887522 at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (the court
found that plaintiff was not entitled to a preliminary injunction where defendant's use of
plaintiff's computer system was very small and there was no showing that the use interfered
with plaintiffs regular business).
125. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
126. 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998).
127. Id. at 550-51.
128. 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
129. Id. at *8. Hotmail's case was bolstered by the fact that the defendant violated the
express terms of its mail service agreement. While today most companies, including Intel,
have computer use policies that regulate how an employee may and may not use business
equipment, those policies may not be broad enough to contemplate actions similar to
Hamidi's. Had Intel's policy expressly prohibited Hamidi's actions, the court may have been
more sympathetic to Intel's position.
130. ld. at *2.
131. Id.
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It is not a matter of "bootstrapping" as the majority suggests to consider
Intel's efforts and the costs it incurred to maintain the security and integrity
of its server as real harm that impaired the quality and value of its computer
system as an internal business device.'32 Intel has concrete, proven damages:
Hamidi used Intel's computer resources; Intel's employees were distracted
by reading, deleting, responding to, and discussing his messages because of
the intentional confusion they created; precious management time was
drained to deal with the employee confusion and distraction; security de-
partment personnel time was used attempting to stop the messages from
bothering Intel's employees; and Intel was deprived of full use and complete
control of its computers for its business purposes for more than a momentary
or theoretical amount of time.
"The time needed to identify and delete 200,000 e-mail messages is not
capable of precise estimation, but it is hardly theoretical or momentary.' '1 33
While one can argue it may only take six seconds to skim and delete an un-
wanted e-mail, consider this: If each e-mail took six seconds to skim and de-
lete, it would take a total of 333 hours, or forty-two business days, to delete
them all. 131 If Intel hired an employee dedicated solely to removing Hamidi's
unwanted e-mails, it would take that employee two entire months to fin-
ish.1 35 As can often be the case, the sum of the whole is greater than the indi-
vidual parts.
Hamidi caused damage by intruding upon Intel's computer system and
impairing Intel's interest in its network.136 Because information and its
transmission have become more valuable, corporations and private individu-
als have pursued their own interests by appropriating the value of that infor-
mation for private use. 13' Those appropriations of value include creating
computer networks and Internet connections, which Intel used to provide its
employees with resources to work more efficiently, research and communi-
cate more rapidly. 3 Hamidi deprived Intel of its exclusive control over its
valuable information system and appropriated that system for his own use to
send and store his messages. Computer space costs money and reduces
equipment available for other uses. The Intel employees were using com-
pany equipment during company time to view and deal with Hamidi's mes-
sages. Intel suffered impairment in the value of its e-mail system when it
132. Intel, 71 P.3d at 328 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 320 n.5 (Brown, J., dissenting). An owner who has been deprived of access to
a chattel for "less than five minutes" has been able to recover for trespass. Id. at 323 (citing
Tubbs v. Delk, 932 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
134. Id. at 323 (Brown, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. See Susan M. Ballantine, Note, Computer Network Trespasses: Solving New Prob-
lems with Old Solutions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209, 248 (2000).
137. Id.
138. Id. In addition to an interest in managing its network resources as its private prop-
erty, Intel has an important interest in managing the physical use of the system, as well as the
permissible content of e-mails. Id. at 249.
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was repeatedly misappropriated for Hamidi's purposes, and this should suf-
fice to show injury.
B. Intel's Injury was Related to its Chattel
Contrary to the majority opinion, the Restatement recognizes that im-
pairment to a chattel may be subjective, and injury is recognized not only
when the trespass reduces the chattel's market value, but also when the tres-
pass affects its value to the owner. 3 9 Even if chattel is used as intended, it is
trespass if used by an unwanted party."'t Merely interfering with an owner's
ability to use the chattel supports a trespass claim.' 4' Not only did Hamidi
interfere with Intel's private computer system, Intel's employees were re-
quired to spend their work time to restore the chattel, i.e. clear their in-boxes
of his e-mails. Even though Intel's computer system may not have suffered
physical harm or functional impairment, Intel lost resources deploying secu-
rity measures, responding to employee concerns, and its employees were less
productive as a result of Hamidi's invasion into its computer system. 42 Intel
has spent millions of dollars on its computer system; 4 3 Hamidi knowingly
and purposefully appropriated it for his own personal purposes. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court unfairly expects Intel to subsidize Hamidi's speech by
providing him with use of its e-mail system and by paying its employees to
read and deal with his e-mail.
C. Businesses Must Have the Right to Exclude Others to Effectively Protect
and Control Their Business Assets
Businesses have a legitimate right to protect their property from unau-
thorized and potentially harmful use. To encourage private investment in
beneficial resources, a business must have the right to exclude others to pro-
tect the value of its private property.'" Where the private property is a tool
the employer uses for the productivity of its employees, such as a computer
system, the property's value is in the employer's ability to put the tool to
139. Intel, 71 P.3d at 323 (Brown, J., dissenting); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 9, § 218 cmt. h.
140. Intel, 71 P.3d at 323 (Brown, J., dissenting). Justice Brown cites the Restatement's
example that A's act of using B's toothbrush could extinguish its value to B. Id. The brushing
constitutes a trespass because it impairs the brush's subjective value to A, rather than its ob-
jective market value. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 9, § 218 cmt. h.
141. Intel, 71 P.3d at 323 (Brown, J., dissenting).
142. Beauregard, supra note 8, at 491 (arguing that the trespass to chattels doctrine
should permit a court to use its equity power to protect against a continued trespass that has
these effects).
143. Intel, 71 P.3d at 313 (Brown, J., dissenting).
144. Respondent's Brief at 10, Intel (No. S103781). 21
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productive use. If the employer's ability to direct the use of the tool is
compromised, the value of that property is reduced.'
6
Intel maintained a proprietary computer network as a tool for transact-
ing and managing its business. 147 While Intel's company policy could have
limited or restricted its employees' personal use of its Internet connection,
Intel chose not to do so and instead allowed reasonable personal use.148
However, Intel was not allowed to control its computer system, nor the time
of its employees, as it desired. It was instead rendered helpless as a result of
Hamidi's actions. Furthermore, Intel's employees do not have a "core right"
to spend company time reading and responding to Hamidi's e-mail.1 49 The
decision whether or not to continue receiving Hamidi's e-mail at work does
not belong to the employees. 5' Just like its telephones and manufacturing
equipment, Intel owns its e-mail system and provides these resources to its
employees for work purposes. 5' Intel's only alternative is to deny all per-
sonal access to the Internet, which is not a sensible solution. 52
Likewise, agreeing to connect to the Internet does not mean the recipi-
ent has agreed to be harassed, or to be inundated with communications. As
Justice Mosk recites the appellate court's example, "connecting one's [pri-
vate] driveway to the general system of roads does not invite demonstrators
to use the property as a public forum."' 53 Nor would it invite the public to
repeatedly use that driveway for their own purposes, after being asked to
leave. To more adequately protect a business's investment in its private net-
work information and activities, the trespass to land theory may indeed
prove a better analogy than trespass to chattels. 5 4 If the court limits its ap-
plicability to cases where consent has been expressly revoked, the trespass to
land analogy is reasonable in the cyberspace context.155
Moreover, messages sent through the Internet are cheap and pass the
cost on to the receiver.'56 Hamidi had alternative ways to reach his target au-
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Intel, 71 P.3d at 326 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
148. Id. Intel's computer usage guidelines stated that the computer system "is to be used
as a resource in conducting business. Reasonable personal use is permitted, but employees are
reminded that these resources are the property of Intel and all information on these resources
is also the property of Intel." Id. Examples of personal use that would not be considered rea-
sonable expressly include "use that adversely affects productivity." Id.




153. Intel, 71 P.3d at 330-31 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
154. See Ballantine, supra note 136, at 212-13 (arguing that a real property trespass
analogy eliminates the need to show tangible harm and allows a private network provider to
prevail upon a showing that the trespasser continued to send unwanted e-mail despite notice
that permission had been denied).
155. Id. at253.
156. See Online Advertising Legal Issues, Spam E-mail, at http://www.unc.edu/
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dience-home e-mail, picketing, paper mail sent to employees' homes, or
advertising.'57 However, he would incur the cost of his communication using
these methods. Instead, he successfully shifted the costs of his communica-
tion to Intel.1 18
Because an employer is oftentimes responsible for its employees' use of
workplace equipment, and employees look to their employer to protect them
during work,'59 the employer should be allowed to regulate the actions of its
employees that are done in the course and scope of their employment, during
business hours, on business premises, using business assets. An employer
has a legitimate interest in monitoring employee e-mail to protect against li-
ability and poor productivity."6 Intel has an interest in ensuring that its pri-
vate property is not used as an implement for harming productivity and dis-
rupting its own workplace. 1' Intel also has a legitimate interest in ensuring
that its employees have a workplace environment that is not distracting or
offensive.'62 Here, Intel only asks the court to support its legitimate business
request.
The e-mail addresses of Intel employees were private; they belonged to
Intel and were not published for use other than for company business.'
63
Hamidi obtained the disk wrongly, and he knew it. 64 If Intel published their
list of employee e-mail addresses to the general public, Hamidi may have
been able to show that Intel instead invited communication; but Intel did not.
Hamidi knew Intel's computer use policy stated that it was for business use
only. 165
~cleelWebpage/unsolicitedemail.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
157. Intel, 71 P.3d at 313 (Brown, J., dissenting); Intel, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257.
158. Intel, 71 P.3d at 313 (Brown, J., dissenting).
159. For example, the employer can be sued for failing to take sufficient steps to prevent
workplace harassment, and the employer must provide workers' compensation insurance to its
employees.
160. See Jarrod J. White, E-mail@WorkCorn: Employer Monitoring of Employee E-
Mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1079-80 (1997) (citing studies that found over twenty percent of
e-mail users have received sexually harassing e-mail, which could subject an employer to a
sexual discrimination lawsuit based on that e-mail evidence). In addition to potential sexual
discrimination or sexual harassment suits, an employer may potentially be liable if an em-
ployee abuses the e-mail system to orchestrate an illegal operation. Id.
161. Respondent's Brief at 14, Intel (No. S103781).
162. Id. Consider the precarious situation an employer may be placed in if, based on the
decision in Intel, it was required to shield its employees from incoming offensive e-mails to
prevent being subjected to a workplace harassment claim. See id at 14 n.3.
163. See Intel, 71 P.3d at 327 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
164. It is hard to imagine one who receives an anonymous disk in the mail, containing
what he knows is a confidential, proprietary list of e-mail addresses from his former em-
ployer, who maintains a computer use policy with which he is familiar, claiming he did not
know it was wrong for him to have the disk.
165. Even if an employer's computer use policy does not cover an employee after termi-
nation from employment, the employee must still be generally familiar with the policy con-
tents from exposure to it while employed. 23
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D. Hamidi's E-mail Violated California Statutory Laws
Hamidi's e-mail trespass was also a form of unlawful spam. There is no
bright-line distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech. 166
"The term 'spam' refers broadly to unsolicited bulk e-mail (or "'junk' e-
mail"), which 'can be either commercial (such as an advertisement) or non-
commercial (such as a joke or chain letter).' ' 167 Courts have found that spam
constitutes a trespass to chattels because it is an intentional intermeddling
with the chattel of another that causes harm by impairing the value of the
chattel to its owner. 68 Moreover, the communications Hamidi sent have the
same qualities as commercial communications and so are analogous to spam,
which is strictly regulated under California law.' 69
Hamidi's communications were sent on behalf of an organization
(FACE-Intel), not an individual. FACE-Intel is a California non-profit cor-
poration, whose members contribute their time and money to pay the entity's
expenses. 7 ' Hamidi's communications were intended to advertise the ser-
vices of FACE-Intel in bringing together a collective uprising against Intel.
FACE-Intel's mission and purpose is to influence not only Intel and its em-
ployees, but also other electronic industry employees.' 7 ' However, Califor-
nia's anti-sparn laws do not provide that the promotion of services must be
for profit, nor do they provide that the promotion must be done by a for-
profit organization, to fall within the statute.'72 The e-mails were unsolicited
and sent to a massive list of recipients with whom Hamidi did not know or
have a relationship. Hamidi was able to send approximately 200,000 e-mails
in total before Intel received the initial injunction. 73
166. Intel, 71 P.3d at 322 n.7 (Brown, J., dissenting).
167. State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 406 n. 1 (Wash. 2001) (citing Sabra Anne Kelin, State
Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 435, 436 n.10
(2001)). "There is considerable debate regarding whether 'spam' encompasses only unsolic-
ited commercial e-mail (UCE) or all UBE [unsolicited bulk e-mail], regardless of its commer-
cial nature." Intel, 71 P.3d at 322 n.7 (Brown, J., dissenting) (citing David E. Sorkin, Techni-
cal and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited Electronic Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 325, 333-35
(2001)).
168. See Ballantine, supra note 136, at 233-34. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (E.D. Va. 1998) (granting summary judgment for claim of trespass to
chattels when defendant sent unauthorized bulk commercial e-mail over plaintiffs computer
network); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1028 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (granting injunction for trespass to chattels against defendant advertising company who
sent high volume of unsolicited e-mail over plaintiff's computer system).
169. See supra notes 22-37 and accompanying text. Alternatively, the majority suggested
that the Legislature "may see fit in the future also to regulate noncommercial e-mail, such as
that sent by Hamidi." Intel, 71 P.3d at 311.
170. FACE Intel, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.faceintel.com/FAQ.htm
(last visited Nov. 9, 2003) (on file with California Western Law Review).
171. See supra notes 45-46.
172. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
173. Intel, 71 P.3d at 300, 313.
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The typical e-mail user would agree-this is spai---a large quantity of
unsolicited, unwanted e-mail sent by an unknown organization to promote
its ideas (either its services or its product) upon the recipient. Harnidi's ac-
tions should, therefore, fall under California's regulation of spam. Because
Hamidi did not comply with the requirements of California's Business and
Professions Code, his actions should be prohibited.
E-mail users do not want to see spam rights encouraged or protected. 174
One of the primary reasons is because spammers are not required to internal-
ize the costs they impose on ISPs and recipients of their e-mails."' E-mail is
cheap to send, but may be costly on the receiving end.176 This causes a shift
in costs from sender to recipient that resembles "sending junk mail with
postage due or making telemarketing calls to someone's pay-per-minute cel-
lular phone."' 177 Before the computer, a person could not easily disrupt a
business without significant cost; but with a computer and through mass
mailing, that person can easily and at virtually no cost disrupt, damage, and
interfere with another's business.1 78
Moreover, in addition to common law tort and statutory anti-spam
claims, Hamidi's actions arguably violated California criminal law prohibit-
ing the unauthorized use of computer services. Illegitimately obtaining the
unauthorized service of a mail delivery system, thereby allowing the defen-
dant to obtain free advertising, has been found to violate other state anti-
computer crime statutes.'79 Hamidi's actions are similar. He knew his mass
e-mails were unwelcome at Intel and that they were taking up valuable net-
work resources and storage space on Intel's system, yet he continued to send
them. He knew he had been directed to stop. He knew Intel claimed a pro-
prietary interest in its computer system and its confidential employee e-mail
addresses, and his possession of the disk containing the e-mail addresses was
unauthorized. He knew and intended that Intel would suffer loss through
lack of employee productivity by reading, deleting, responding, discussing,
and through its security personnel trying to block his multiple messages. Yet
174. See Marshall, supra note 93, at 479.
175. See Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 267 (2002).
176. Id. at 268.
177. State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 410 (Wash. 2001).
178. Intel, 71 P.3d at 330 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
179. See Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (E.D. Va. 1998). The
court found that the defendant had violated the Virginia Computer Crimes Act, Va- Code Sec-
tion 18.2-152.3(3), which provided that "[a]ny person who uses a computer or computer net-
work without authority and with the intent to [c]onvert the property of another shall be guilty
of the crime of computer fraud." Id. By disguising the electronic header information, which
allowed the defendant to send its messages through America Online's system despite its
blocking filters and mail controls, the defendant unlawfully transferred the costs of sending its
messages to American Online. Id. See also Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc.,
121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1273-77 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (applying Virginia law) (holding that a
spammer who harvested e-mail addresses and sent unsolicited bulk e-mail to ISP's customers
in violation of its terms of service, had accessed ISP's computers without authorization,
which was prohibited by state anti-computer crime laws). 25
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he purposefully evaded detection by disguising his messages and was suc-
cessful in transferring to Intel the cost of delivering his bulk messages.
Hamidi's actions should have subjected him to criminal and civil penalties
under California law as well.
E. Injury Sufficient for Trespass to Chattels Should be Broadened
In cases of cyberspace trespass, injury, though real, may be very hard
for a party to prove. Therefore, this Note posits that injury sufficient for tres-
pass to chattels should include foreseeable consequential economic harm that
is proximately caused by the trespasser's actions. This should be reasonably
limited to situations where a showing of physical harm may not be feasible
and the trespasser has clear notice that his entry is unwelcome and unauthor-
ized. Just because harm may be hard to quantify (e.g., burden on the com-
puter system, use of computer disk space, intangible electrons), does not
mean it does not exist. 80 Injury to a chattel should be expanded given to-
day's electronic age and use of technology, to include economic injury that
is the foreseeable and proximate consequence of the trespasser's actions.
Some courts have been willing to acknowledge that non-traditional
damage claims are equally viable. In Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Proc-
essing, Inc.,181 the court declined to dismiss a trespass to chattels claim be-
cause Oyster had successfully shown evidence of some "use" of its computer
system when the defendant's agent sent robots to Oyster's website to copy
Oyster's metatags.' 82 The court found that the "negligible load" and "mini-
mal interference" on Oyster's system did not prevent it from prevailing on
its trespass claim because the copying of the metatags was sufficient.'83 In
CompuServe, the court acknowledged that harm to business reputation and
goodwill were viable claims of injury, aside from the physical impact of the
messages.' The California Supreme Court should do the same.
Where a showing of actual physical injury is not feasible because of the
electronic nature of the trespass or because the trespass has not yet caused a
total system crash, the court should look more broadly at an injury claim to
include those damages which are foreseeable and proximately caused by the
trespasser. A business has a legally protected interest in its computer system,
the electronic messages that flow to and from that system, and in ensuring its
employees are allowed to perform their work without interference from un-
welcome and harassing outsiders who have been asked to leave. It is unrea-
180. Intel, 71 P.3d at 320 (Brown, J., dissenting).
181. 2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal.).
182. Id. at *11-13 (applying California law). "Metatags" are Hypertext Markup Lan-
guage ("HTML") code which describe the contents of an Internet web site to a search engine.
Id. at *1 n.3.
183. Id. at*13.
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sonable to turn an injured party away until a major physical crash that can be
more easily quantified occurs.
CONCLUSION
Every person or employer who owns property should have the right to
put up a "No Trespassing" sign, have that sign respected by the public, and
backed by judicial enforcement when necessary.
Courts must balance the competing public policies of freedom of ex-
pression against the protection of private property interests from unauthor-
ized use.185 While some propose a new legal framework to accomplish
this, 86 the historical common law doctrine of trespass to chattels can be eas-
ily molded to accommodate the electronic age. If courts are willing to apply
this doctrine in a progressive light, we need not create a new cause of action
or adopt new legislation to protect private property in cyberspace.18 7 As we
look to the future and the seemingly endless opportunities the Internet pro-
vides, we must reexamine the way in which trespass to chattels will likely
occur to ensure the injury component we require an injured party to prove is
realistic. In cyberspace, trespass may occur in non-traditional, non-physical
ways; therefore, the injury that occurs may also be non-traditional and non-
physical. But it is nonetheless a real injury.
The business community should be concerned with the floodgate effect
that this California Supreme Court ruling will create: mass electronic mail-
ings into business environments, with no way for the employer to control the
flow or limit the financial exposure those mailings will create. While pro-
tecting expressive activity is one of the cornerstones our society is built
upon, an unwilling listener should not have to bear the costs of that speech
by surrendering its business assets for the speaker's use. In many businesses,
including Intel, one of its primary assets is its employees' time and services;
the physical definition of injury this court requires does not give credence to
human capital. Unable to appeal to either the courts or the legislature, busi-
nesses would be forewarned to hold on tightly to their employee e-mail ad-
185. See Ronnie Cohen & Janine S. Miller, Towards a Theory of Cyberspace: A Pro-
posalfor a New Legal Framework, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH 2, 52-65 (2003) (proposing a new
legal framework to balance online access and speech rights with online property rights, under
which particular uses of the Internet are designated as "places of public accommodation,"
which carry with them certain protectable rights).
186. Id.
187. But see Burk, supra note 81, at 27 (proposing a new theory of "digital nuisance" in
lieu of a cyberspace trespass action to better balance the competing interests created in bulk e-
mail cases not well-suited for the arcane common law tort). See also R. Clifton Merrell, Note,
Trespass to Chattels in the Age of the Internet, 80 WASHi. U. L.Q. 675, 676 (2002).
"[A]pplying trespass to chattels to the Internet is like driving a horse and buggy on the infor-
mation super-highway." Id. This commentator suggests that a legislative solution should be
found to strike a balance between the competing interests of protecting businesses and their
investment information and bandwidth, while still encouraging the growth and freedom of
communication of the Internet. Id. 27
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dresses to prevent future Hamidis from flooding their company e-mail sys-
tems.188 It appears inevitable that at some point, legislative regulation of un-
solicited bulk e-mail (rather than simply unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail)
will be required.'89
Here, Hamidi intentionally and knowingly used Intel's computer system
to repeatedly send mass mailings to its employees, knowing full well and in-
tending that his communications would cause a reaction in Intel's employ-
ees. Hamidi knew and intended to enter Intel's private domain, even though
Intel requested that he leave, intentionally using Intel's own private property
to air his personal views. Intel runs a business, and, like its photocopy ma-
chines and its telephone system, it must be able to protect and control its
computer system and its employees' time for its own business purposes.
Despite Intel's demands that he stop, and its efforts at self-help, Hamidi
persisted in intruding where he was not welcome. Intel posted a "Private
Property, Keep Out" sign, but Hamidi refused to comply, and the California
Supreme Court refuses to honor it.
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